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Forcing the Bystander to Get Involved:
A Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses
to Report Crime
Criminal activity is continuing at an alarming rate in the United
States,' causing widespread fear 2 and changing how people live their
lives.' Although some citizens assist the police in combatting crime,4 the
majority of crime goes unreported,5 severely hampering the efforts of the
police.' Without prompt crime reporting by citizens, the chance of appre-
hending criminals diminishes significantly.7
Commentators have proposed to increase citizen involvement in all
emergencies, both criminal and noncriminal, through the imposition of an
affirmative duty to rescue.' While such a duty may be appropriate in
1. Nearly a third of all American households were victimized by serious crime in 1981. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUS-
TICE 7 (1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
2. More than 60% of residents in large cities fear walking outside at night. See W. SKOGAN & M.
MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME: INDIVIDUAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD REACTIONS 47 (1981).
3. Forty-five percent of urban residents limit personal activity because they fear crime. See J.
GAROFALO, PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT CRIME: THE ATTITUDES OF VICTIMS AND NONVICTIMS IN
SELECTED CITIES 76 (1977).
4. For example, some cities have established "neighborhood watch" or "block watcher" crime
reporting programs which, in certain instances, have produced dramatic crime reductions. Crim. Just.
Newsletter, Feb. 28, 1983, at 6.
5. Particularly tragic cases, like that of Catherine Genovese, provide anecdotal evidence of the
severity of the problem of witness' failure to report crimes. On March 13, 1964, Ms. Genovese was
viciously attacked and killed while 38 of her neighbors failed to call the police from the safety of their
apartments. See A. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHr WrrNSSES 29-30 (1964). Official estimates indi-
cate that only 47% of violent crimes and only one third of all crimes are reported to the police.
REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-25. Some research has found underreporting to be less severe than
suggested by government statistics. See Myers, Why Are Crimes Underreported? What is the Crime
Rate? Does it Really Matter?, 61 Soc. Scm. Q. 23, 32-33 (1980) (mathematical adjustment of Uni-
form Crime Statistics yielded 10% increase over official national reporting rate estimates), while ex-
periments involving staged crimes show reporting rates as low as six or seven percent. Bickman &
Green, Situational Cues and Crime Reporting: Do Signs Make a Difference?, 7 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 8 (1977); Dertke, Penner & Ulrich, Observer's Reporting of Shoplifting as a Func-
tion of Thiefs Race and Sex, 94 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 213, 217 (1974).
6. The proportion of crime directly discovered by the police may be less than six percent. See
Mawby, Witnessing Crime Toward a Model of Public Intervention, 7 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 437,
443 (1980); see also Black, Production of Crime Rates, 35 AM. Soc. REv. 733, 735 (1970) (vast
majority of crime known to police by citizen reports rather than proactive police efforts).
7. The probability of arrest for a crime reported in progress is 33%. A mere fifteen-minute delay
in reporting reduces this probability to 5%. REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
8. See, e.g., Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REv. 499, 509 (1965)
(proposing duty to act when harm or loss is imminent and costs of acting are less than harm to be
avoided); Scheid, Affirmative Duty to Act in Emergency Situations-The Return of the Good Samari-
tan, 3 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 1, 16 (1969) (proposing duty to act in order to prevent death or
serious bodily harm when no personal risk to rescuer); Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90
YALE L.J. 247 (1980) (proposing duty of "easy rescue," requiring action to remedy dangerous situa--
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some emergencies, it would be unwise to impose it in the criminal context,
because of the danger of vigilantism. 9 As an alternative, this Note pro-
poses the enactment of a criminal statute mandating the reporting of felo-
nies directly witnessed by citizens.
I. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILURE TO REPORT CRIME
In recent years, social psychology researchers have attempted to provide
scientific explanations for the lack of bystander intervention in emer-
gencies1" and the underreporting of crime. Rather than attributing by-
stander inaction to callousness or selfishness, their work points to signifi-
cant sociological and psychological factors" that affect such behavior.
Chief among these factors is diffusion of responsibility. The presence of
several or more bystanders diffuses individual responsibility and blame
for not helping among the group, thereby serving both to reduce12 and to
tion when no significant cost to rescuer); Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal
Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1273 (1983) (proposing criminal sanctions for those who fail to attempt to
assist others in physical danger).
9. For the purposes of this Note, "vigilantism" refers to self-help actions by citizens that tend to
disrupt the administration of the criminal justice system.
10. The research of social-psychologists who have studied emergency intervention is highly rele-
vant in explaining crime reporting behavior for two reasons. First, many of these experiments have
involved staged criminal events. See, e.g., Moriarty, Crime, Commitment, and the Responsive By-
stander: Two Field Experiments, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 370 (1975) (staged
thefts); Schwartz & Gottlieb, Bystander Anonymity and Reactions to Emergencies, 39 J. PERSONAL-
rY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 418 (1980) (simulated robbery employing physical force); Shotland & Steb-
bins, Bystander Response to Rape: Can a Victim Attract Help?, 10 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
510 (1980) (auditory simulation of forcible rape).
Second, one of the primary options open to subjects in these experiments, be they criminal or
noncriminal situations, is to report the staged event to an authority figure, such as the experimenter or
victim. See, e.g., Darley, & Latani, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diftfsion of Responsibil-
ity, 8 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 377 (1968) (opportunity to report seizure to experi-
menter), Moriarty, supra (opportunity to report theft to victim); Schwartz & Gottlieb, supra (oppor-
tunity to telephone experimenter to report robbery). Thus, these intervention experiments have
explored the dynamics of behavior that surround summoning assistance and reporting unusual events.
11. The factors described in this Note certainly do not exhaust all of the possible sociological,
psychological or other explanations for bystander behavior. See infra note 113. Nor would all of the
social-psychologists who are conducting research in this area agree with the use of the labels this Note
employs for the theories they describe. See Schwartz & Gottlieb, Bystander Reactions to a Violent
Theft Crime in Jerusalem, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1188 (1976) (claiming that
other research on bystander intervention in emergencies has confused and mislabeled underlying
processes involved).
12. See, e.g., Korte, Effects of Individual Responsibility and Group Communication on Help-
giving in an Emergency, 24 HuM. RE. 149, 154 (1971); LatanE & Rodin, A Lady in Distress:
Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention, 5 J. Exp. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
189, 193 (1969); Shaffer, Rogel & Hendrick, Intervention in the Library: The Effect of Increased
Responsibility on Bystanders' Willingness to Prevent a Theft, 5 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 303,
315 (1975). But see Piliavin & Rodin, Good Samaritanism: An Underground Phenomenon?, 13 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 289, 296-97 (1969) (effects of diffusion of responsibility may be
outweighed by increased probability that at least one bystander will render assistance when number of
bystanders increases); Yinon, Sharon, Gonen & Adom, Escape From Responsibility and Help in
Emergencies Among Persons Alone or Within Groups, 12 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 301, 303
(1982) (increased number of bystanders more likely to report suspicious package).
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delay"3 intervention, at times resulting in inaction by all.14 Indeed, the
effects of diffusion of responsibility may be more pronounced in the area
of crime reporting because bystanders tend to place the responsibility for
the control of criminal activity on specific groups in the population, such
as the police or politicians.
Closely related to diffusion of responsibility is the tendency of individ-
ual behavior to be influenced by the behavior and expectations of others.
Bystander behavior reflects this "social influence" in a number of ways.
First, the behavior of others serves as a model for bystanders. Thus, the
inaction of other witnesses may encourage an individual bystander to do
nothing,15 while positive social influence may encourage certain bystander
behavior. Research has found that verbal encouragement' and interper-
sonal influence' 7 can increase crime reporting. Second, bystanders some-
times perceive that others are evaluating their reactions and behavior in
response to an emergency or crime. Calling this concern "evaluation ap-
prehension,""' researchers have theorized that an anonymous bystander
who is immune from negative evaluations is less likely to intervene than
one who is not.19 Thus, the underreporting of crime may be due in part to
a lack of perceived social pressure. Finally, social norms play a role in
encouraging bystander behavior. For example, the norm of male assertive-
ness may encourage intervention by males, particularly when in the pres-
ence of females.20 Contrary to the theory of diffusion of responsibility,
some researchers have postulated the existence of a "norm of social re-
sponsibility," reinforced by the presence of additional bystanders, which
encourages helpful behavior. 1
Another factor affecting bystander reactions is the immobilization that
occurs due to indecision. Onlookers' failure to intervene is not the result of
a conscious decision but rather due to an unresolved internal conflict con-
cerning whether to act, and what course of action to take.22 This indeci-
13. See, e.g., Schwartz & Clausen, Responsibility, Norms, and Helping in an Emergency, 16 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 299, 304 (1970) (lone bystanders respond faster); Schwartz &
Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 425 (same); Schwartz & Gottlieb, supra note 11, at 1194 (same).
14. See Darley & LatanE, supra note 10, at 377.
15. See Darley, Teger & Lewis, Do Groups Always Inhibit Individuals' Responses to Potential
Emergencies, 26 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 395 (1973) (discussing pluralistic ignorance;
bystanders conform to passive nonhelping behavior of others); Latan6 & Rodin supra, note 12, at 193
(unresponsive bystanders inhibited helping by others).
16. See Bickman & Rosenbaum, Crime Reporting as a Function of Bystander Encouragement,
Surveillance and Credibility, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGy 577, 580 (1977) (verbal
encouragement of stranger found to increase reporting of shoplifting).
17. Bickman & Green, supra note 5, at 14-15.
18. Schwartz & Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 418-19.
19. Id. at 419.
20. See Schwartz & Clausen, supra note 13, at 307.
21. Yinon, Sharon, Gonen & Adom, supra note 12, at 304.
22. B. LATANE & J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE HELP?
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sion stems from the lack of information available to the bystander. Ob-
serving a crime or an accident is a rare occurrence for most people.23 A
witness must first decide whether an emergency that requires interven-
tion,2 4 is in fact occurring and then determine a proper response. The
more ambiguous the accident or crime, the less likely it is that bystanders
will intervene or even report the situation. 5 Even if a witness determines
that an event is a serious accident or crime, indecision over what type of
intervention is necessary may result in a complete failure to act. Once
informed of the proper course of action, however, a bystander is more
likely to intervene.26
Others in the field have proposed a cost-benefit model of crime report-
ing or bystander intervention,2 7 suggesting that the bystander weighs the
costs and benefits of reporting and then acts accordingly. The bystander
will take into account both psychological costs such as guilt,28 and more
tangible ones, such as possible legal repercussions29 or physical reprisal by
the criminal.30
In fact, all of the social and psychological factors discussed above inter-
act with one another to produce a net effect on crime reporting or by-
stander intervention. For example, diffusion of responsibility may lower
the social costs to individual bystanders of not helping, making it easier
31-36 (1970). (describing the many decisions bystander must make quickly when confronted with
emergency situation).
23. Even police rarely witness a crime. See Bickman, Bystander Intervention in a Crime, in
VICTIMS AND SOCIETY 144, 145 (1976) (average Los Angeles police officer directly witnesses robbery
only once in 14 years).
24. See Shotland & Huston, Emergencies: What Are They and Do They Influence Bystanders to
Intervene?, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1822 (1979) (attempting to define characteris-
tics of an emergency, noting that bystanders more likely to intervene when they perceive increasing
threat of harm to victim).
25. See Clark & Word, Where is the Apathetic Bystander? Situational Characteristics of the
Emergency, 29 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 279 (1974) (possible electrocution of worker;
less help when ambiguity surrounds accident); Clark & Word, Why Don't Bystanders Help? Because
of Ambiguity?, 24 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 392 (1972) (maintenance worker failing
from ladder; less help in ambiguous situation); Shotland & Stebbins, supra note 10, at 521-22 (by-
standers reluctant to take action upon hearing simulated rape because of uncertainty about what was
happening).
26. See Schwartz & Clausen, supra note 13, at 305.
27. Bleda, Bleda, Byrne & White, When a Bystander Becomes an Accomplice: Situational Deter-
minants of Reactions to Dishonesty, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 9, 23 (1976); Kidd,
Crime Reporting: Toward a Social Psychological Model, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 380 (1979); Piliavin &
Rodin, supra note 12, at 298.
28. Shaffer, Rogel & Hendrick, supra note 12, at 317.
29. See Gelfand, Hartman, Walder & Page, Who Reports Shoplifters? A Field-Experimental
Study, 25 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 276, 283 (1973) (41% of subjects who failed to
report shoplifting stated as reason either fear of a countersuit for false accusation or demands of a
court appearance) [hereinafter cited as Gelfand].
30. Fear of physical reprisal may be a rare cause of not reporting crime. According to the Depart-
ment of Justice, it was a reason for failure to report in only one percent of personal crimes. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1981, at 75, table 100 (1983).
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for them to fail to act."' The labels are assigned only to make some sense
out of the dynamics that underly a complex behavior.
II. COMMON LAW ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF
WITNESS FAILURE TO REPORT CRIME
Any serious consideration of the issues surrounding the reporting of
crime must include a discussion of the common law offense of misprision
of felony. Such a discussion is, however, complicated by the fact that it is
unclear what the offense is"2 or, more fundamentally, whether it now ex-
ists or has ever existed.3
Under English law, the common law offense, now legislatively abol-
ished," had an uncertain definition. In Sykes v. Director of Public Prose-
cutions, 5 Lord Denning held that misprision of felony had always existed
in the common law of England36 and that it consisted of knowledge that a
felony had been committed and a failure to disclose it.37 In fact, however,
English courts seemed to require some role in the crime, not simply a
mere passive failure to report it.38
31. Howard & Crano, Effect of Sex, Conversation, Location, and Size of Observer Group on
Bystander Intervention in a High Risk Situation, 37 SocioMEmY 491, 504 (1974) (staged theft).
32. E.g., Howard, Misprisions, Compoundings and Compromises, 1959 Cam. L. REv. 750 ("A
short description might run as follows: misprision of felony is the misdemeanour of failing to commu-
nicate to the proper authority one's knowledge of the commission of a felony; but this apparently
simple statement bristles with uncertainties.").
33. E.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rr, CRIMINAL LAW 526 (1972) ("It is doubtful whether this
offense ever had a meaningful existence beyond the textbook writers. The offense was said to be
'practically obsolete' in England almost a century ago .... Doubt has been expressed as to whether
this offense was ever inherited by the United States as a part of the common law.") (footnotes
omitted).
34. See Comment, Misprision of Felony: A Reappraisal, 23 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1100-01 nn.35 &
36 (1974).
35. [1962] A.C. 528.
36. There is an extensive debate as to whether misprision of felony did indeed have a historical
foundation in English common law. Glazebrook, in an exhaustive examination of English history,
concludes that the offense never really existed but was the result of an accident in interpretation. See
Glazebrook, Mispriion of Felony-Shadow or Phantom? (pts. 1 & 2), 8 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 &
283 (1964). Other commentators who have examined the English precedents have concluded other-
wise. See Allen, Misprision, 78 LAw Q. REv. 40, 51-52 (1962); Comment, supra note 34, 1096-98;
Recent Cases, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 338, 340-41 (1941).
37. The immediate reaction to the Sykes decision was negative; commentators considered the of-
fense too vague and broad in its announced form. See Allen, supra note 36, at 55-61; Glazebrook,
How Long, Then, Is the Arm of the Law to Be?, 25 Mo. L. REv. 301 (1962). Later commentators
have been more receptive of the offense, albeit in modified form. See Comment, supra note 34, at
1112-17 (recommending limiting offense to small class of felonies and imposing duty only on public
officers); Cases Noted, Misprision of Felony: A Crime Whose Time Has Come, Again, 28 U. FLA. L.
REv. 199, 212-13 (1975) (advocating establishing exception for family members and limiting class of
felonies). Other commentators are divided. See Goldberg, Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a
New Context, 52 A.B.A.J. 148 (1966) (recommending retention of crime in Sykes form); Comment,
Misprision of Felony Not a Crime in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 222, 229 (1975) (favoring
retention of original common law offense); Recent Cases, 54 HARV. L. REv. 506 (1941) (urging
rejection of offense); Recent Decisions, 32 VA. L. REv. 170 (1945) (same).
38. English courts have applied misprision of felony only in those cases where the defendant was
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In the United States, the offense is also only vaguely defined. At the
federal level there has long been a misprision of felony statute,39 which
requires persons to make felonies known to an appropriate United States
authority. Despite the statute's broad language, a mere failure to report is
not sufficient for a conviction. Federal courts uniformly require an affirm-
ative act of concealment to complete this crime.40
With few exceptions, 41 modem state courts and legislatures have en-
tirely rejected the existence of a common law misprision of felony offense
as incompatible with modern society.42 It is not clear what the crime re-
quired at the state level. One common definition of the offense was that
stated by the Supreme Court of Vermont:
Misprision of felony is an offense at common law, and is described
as a criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from being committed
or to bring the offender to justice after its commission, but without
such previous concert with or subsequent assistance of him as will
make the concealer an accessory before or after the fact. 3
Other precedent supported the notion that the offense consisted of fail-
not a mere bystander, but had some role in the crime itself. See, e.g., Lucraft, 50 Grim. App. 296
(1966) (defendant helped count money from robbery); Regina v. King [1965] 1 W.L.R. 706 (defen-
dant hired car used by others in robbery); Sykes, [1962] A.C. 528, (defendant approached waiter
asking if he was an I.R.A. contact who could help others sell stolen firearms). It appears, therefore,
that the English misprision of felony offense is designed to fill the void, punishing those persons who
have not done quite enough in furtherance of the crime to be considered an accessory after the fact,
but have nevertheless become involved with the underlying offense.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) ("Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be
fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.").
40. See, e.g., United States v. Baez, 732 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Davila,
698 F.2d 715, 717 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1977).
For a detailed discussion of the federal offense, see Shannonhouse, Misprision of a Federal Felony:
Dangerous Relic or Scourge of Malfeasance?, 4 U. BALT. L. Rav. 59 (1974).
41. See State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520, 522, 217 A.2d 432, 433 (1966) (offense exists in Rhode
Island); State v. Carson, 274 S.C. 316, 318, 262 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1980) (common law offense exists
in South Carolina).
42. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Pope v. State, 284
Md. 309, 352, 396 A.2d 1054, 1078 (1979); State v. Young, 7 Ohio App. 2d 194, 200, 220 N.E.2d
146, 151 (1966). Three states-Louisiana, Maine, and New Jersey-that had misprision of felony
statutes patterned after the federal statute have repealed them. See reporter's comment to LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:131 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 901 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A: 97-2 (West 1969 & Supp. 1984). In New Jersey, mere failure to report constituted misprision.
See State v. Conquest, 152 N.J. Super. 382, 377 A.2d 1239 (1977); State v. Hann, 40 N.J.L. 228
(1878). In Louisiana and Maine, misprision was interpreted as requiring something more than a
mere failure to report a felony. See State v. Michaud, 150 Me. 479, 484, 114 A.2d 352, 355 (1955)
(must be act of positive concealment); State v. Graham, 190 La. 669, 680, 182 So. 711, 714 (1938)
(misprision of felony statute equivalent to accessory after the fact offense). Only South Dakota retains
such a statute, but it has remained uninterpreted. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-11-12 (1979).
43. State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
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ing to use force to prevent a felony committed in one's presence.4' The
majority view, however, was that common law misprision of felony at the
state level consisted of a failure to report a crime to the authorities plus an
additional element- an evil intent' 5 or some positive act." Decisions in-
terpreting the status of various parties to a crime reflect American courts'
reluctance to impose a positive duty to report crime.47 For example, the
mere passive failure to disclose a crime to the authorities does not make
one an accesssory after the fact.48 The law requires a positive act of con-
cealment' or some other sort of assistance. 50 Similarly, a failure to dis-
close knowledge of a crime, without any other act, will not render one an
accomplice to a crime51 or an accessory before the fact.52 No criminal lia-
bility results from failure to report the imminent commission of a crime,53
44. See Suell v. Derricott, 161 Ala. 259, 272-73, 49 So. 895, 900-01 (1909) (citing Carpenter v.
State, 62 Ark. 286, 308, 36 S.W. 900, 906 (1896)).
45. See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 459, 61 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1945); State v. Wil-
son, 80 Vt. 249, 254, 67 A. 533, 534 (1907).
46. See State v. Carson, 274 S.C. 316, 262 S.E.2d 918 (1980) (defendant deliberately concealed
information when questioned by police); cf. State v. Biddle, 32 Del. 401, 124 A. 804 (1923) (offense
requires willful neglect to prevent felony or prosecute in addition to failure to report); Wren v. Com-
monwealth, 67 Va. 952, 961-62 (1875) (police officer purposely neglected duty to arrest felon).
47. Note the following dictum from Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822):
"It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offence which comes
to his knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty is
too harsh for man."
48. See, e.g., Russey & Way v. State, 257 Ark. 570, 575, 519 S.W.2d 751, 755 (1975); Lowe v.
People, 135 Colo. 209, 215, 309 P.2d 601, 604 (1957); Manry v. State, 77 Ga. App. 43, 51, 47 S.E.2d
817, 822 (1948); Maddox v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ky. 1960); State v. Jackson, 344
So.2d 961, 963 (La. 1977); McClain v. State, 10 Md. App. 106, 115, 268 A.2d 572, 576 (1970); State
v. Hicks, 22 N.C. App. 554, 557, 207 S.E.2d 318, 320, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 761, 209 S.E.2d 286
(1974); Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 195, 19 A.2d 71, 75 (1941).
49. As used in statutes defining liability as an accessory after the fact, the word "conceals" has
been interpreted to require an affirmative act. See People v. Garnett, 129 Cal. 364, 366, 61 P. 1114,
1115 (1900); State v. Brown, 197 Neb. 131, 133, 247 N.W.2d 616, 617 (1976); f. People v. Stiles, 46
Ill. App. 3d 359, 363, 360 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (1977) (interpreting concealing of homicidal death
statute).
It is not always clear however, exactly what type of action constitutes affirmative concealment for
purposes of establishing liability as an accessory after the fact. For example while some courts have
held that the giving of false information to the authorities is sufficient, see, e.g., People v. Duffy, 269
Cal. App. 2d 97, 103-04, 74 Cal. Rptr. 606, 609 (1969); State v. Potter, 221 N.C. 153, 156, 19
S.E.2d 257, 259 (1942); Prine v. State, 509 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), others have
taken the opposite view. See, e.g., Farmer v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 380, 381-82, 40 P.2d 693, 694
(1935); State v. Clifford, 263 Or. 436, 440-41, 502 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1972); Findley v. State, 378
S.W.2d 850, 852-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
50. See, e.g., James v. State, 351 So. 2d 693, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Moore v. State, 94 Ga.
App. 210, 211-12, 94 S.E.2d 80, 83-84 (1956); McClain v. State, 10 Md. App. 106, 114-15, 268
A.2d 572, 576 (1970).
51. See, e.g., Stevens v. State, 111 Ark. 299, 303, 163 S.W. 778, 780 (1914); State v. Lewis, 539
S.W.2d 451, 453-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Guild, 111 Pa. Super. 349, 352-53,
170 A. 699, 700 (1934); Miller v. State, 72 S.W. 996 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903).
52. Sams v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 393, 398-99, 171 S.W.2d 989, 992 (1943).
53. See, e.g., Dowdle v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Hightower v.
State, 78 Tex. Crim. 606, 607-08, 182 S.W. 492, 493 (1916).
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and there is no obligation to report exculpatory information to the
authorities."
III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM THROUGH OTHER LEGAL MEANS
Non-legal means, such as publicity campaigns 5 and rewards,"' have
proven insufficient in encouraging crime reporting, perhaps because only
those who are already willing to report crimes can be reached by noncoer-
cive measures.5" These measures need to be supplemented by more effec-
tive means in order to reach a larger segment of the population. Two
possibilities would be either the imposition of a duty to rescue in criminal
situations, 58 or the creation of civil penalties for not reporting crimes.
A. Duty to Rescue
Imposing an affirmative duty to rescue in criminal situations brings
with it the dangers of vigilantism and interference with the criminal jus-
tice system. The American legal system has long provided for citizen par-
ticipation in the criminal justice process.59 However, in order to guard
54. People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 316-19, 406 N.E.2d 771, 774-76, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914,
918-19 (1980).
55. See Bickman, Bystander Intervention in a Crime: The Effect of a Mass-Media Campaign, 5
J. APPUED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 296 (1975) (publicity efforts to encourage reporting of shoplifting in
college bookstore found ineffective); cf Bickman & Green, supra note 5, at 7, 12 (signs posted in
supermarket to encourage reporting of shoplifting found ineffective). But see Klentz & Beaman, The
Effects of Type of Information and Method of Dissemination on the Reporting of a Shoplifter, 11 J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 64 (1981) (giving information on crime reporting in lecture format in-
creases reporting rate).
56. See Bickman & Helwig, Bystander Reporting of a Crime, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 283, 290 (1979)
(rewards ineffective); cf Bickman & Green, Is Revenge Sweet? The Effect of Attitude Toward a Thief
on Crime Reporting, 2 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 101, 109 (1975) (intangible benefit of retribution
against an unpleasant offender does not affect crime reporting).
57. It is unclear how large a segment of the population is indifferent to positive inducements to
crime reporting. Some research suggests that many are indifferent to the effectiveness of police in their
decision whether to report crime. Bickman, Attitude Toward an Authority and the Reporting of a
Crime, 39 SocIoMErRY 76 (1976); Hawkins, Who Called the Cops?: Decisions to Report Criminal
Victimization, 7 LAw & Soc'y REv. 427, 439 (1973). Other research reveals that the young and
better educated are less likely to report crime. This has been explained by a lack of commitment to
community and a sense of alienation from authority. Blum-West, Calling the Cops: A Study of Why
People Report Crimes, 11 J. PoLiCE Sci. & AD. 8, 14 (1983).
58. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Two states have laws which appear to impose such
a duty. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
Both of these statutes make the failure to render reasonable assistance to another exposed to grave
physical harm a misdemeanor (when the giving of such assistance can be done with little peril to the
onlooker).
Similarly, many of the European civil law countries have long had affirmative duty to rescue laws.
See Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions
Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. CoMp. L. 630 (1966) (discussing the provisions in numer-
ous European countries); Note, Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the Duty
to Rescue, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 529 (comparing American law to that of Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia).
59. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
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against vigilante acts, strict limits have been placed on the actions which
citizens may take to prevent crime."0 Although the provision of informa-
tion by citizens is essential, the advent of modern police forces has greatly
reduced the need for direct citizen participation in the apprehension of
criminals6 ' and actions permissible for police, the official guardians of or-
der, are not always available to private citizens.6 2
Mandatory intervention in criminal situations would constitute a retreat
from the idea that society's designated agents, the police, should enforce
the law, and a movement toward the more primitive notion of self-help.'
The dangers of "self-help justice" are especially acute at the apprehension
stage, when emotions can distort rational behavior, 4 and lead to vigilan-
tism. 5 Requiring citizens to intervene in criminal emergencies would up-
60. The criminal law regards the use of physical or deadly force by citizens in criminal situations
to be excusable, not laudable. A private citizen may use deadly force only to prevent the escape of a
violent felon. See Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968) (citizen con-
victed of second degree murder for shooting fleeing prowler). Similarly, one may not shoot another
who is committing a felony unless there is a fear of bodily injury. See State v. McIntyre, 106 Ariz.
439, 477 P.2d 529 (1970) (defendant convicted of second degree murder for shooting deceased five
times to prevent an unarmed assault and battery). Penal provisions which allow citizens to use physi-
cal or deadly force to prevent crimes or defend others are usually compiled under sections providing
for defenses to criminal liability. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-3-21 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1975). In Alexander v. State, 52 Md. App.
171, 447 A.2d 880, affld, 294 Md. 600, 451 A.2d 664 (1982) the court, interpreting Maryland's
statutory recognition of a defense for third parties intervening in violent assaults, noted that: "[A]n
intent to punish the offender or to avenge his victim will not suffice. The purpose of the intervention
must have been 'to aid' the victim, or the statutory absolution is lost." Id. at 887.
These provisions are rightly termed defenses because the acts committed by the citizens would be
crimes under other circumstances. Our criminal justice system would be too harsh if it punished
reasonable citizens acting in good faith during criminal emergencies. However, there are those who
have perverted the meaning of these provisions. The Federation of Greater New York Rifle and Pistol
Clubs, for example, has on occasion given $200 "Courageous Citizen Awards" to individuals who
have engaged in armed self-defense, including killing when necessary. See Crim. Control Dig., May 2,
1977, at 9.
61. In one study of Brooklyn police, the average response time to "crime in progress" calls was
less than three minutes. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4. 1976, at 1, col. 5.
62. For example, the Model Penal Code limits the privilege of using deadly force to effectuate an
arrest to peace officers and to individuals assisting police officers. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 2(b)ii
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
63. Professor Donald Black suggests that, despite the advanced development of law in modem
society, we are not much removed from more primitive cultures where self-help is the dominant means
of righting wrongs. Black interprets much of present crime as the result not of irrational or pecuniary
motives, but rather the desire to redress wrongs and grievances. Black, Crime as Social Control, 48
AM. Soc. REV. 34 (1983).
64. An intervening witness might use excessive force or misinterpret the situation entirely, causing
more harm than good. Cf People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962)
(intervening citizen convicted of assault on plainclothes police officer who was attempting to subdue
suspect, despite defendant's admitted good faith belief that an assault rather than an arrest was
occurring).
65. Historically, those areas of the United States which lacked a sufficient body of law enforce-
ment officers were most prone to outbreaks of vigilante justice. An example is California. Soon after
the gold rush of 1849, California was incorporated as a state of the union. The early California state
government failed to establish sufficient order in the mines, or to protect personal property. One
consequence was that county sheriffs were often unable to protect accused prisoners from angry lynch
mobs. See M. WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE OF VIGILANCE OF 1851, at
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set the legal system's delicate balance between necessary private acts and
self-help."6 Imposing a duty to rescue in criminal situations gives vigilante
justice official approval.67
Even that citizen intervention which is not tainted by vigilantism is
problematic and costly. Given the lack of full legal redress for those whose
rights have been violated by citizen intervenors and the absence of guide-
lines regulating such intervention, the imposition of a duty to intervene
would create many problems for criminal justice officials. The costs of
intervention by untrained individuals in a criminal emergency exceed
those of intervention in a noncriminal emergency.6 s The vast majority of
citizens have little police training.6 9 In addition to endangering them-
selves,70 these intervenors may endanger other bystanders71 and impede
the course of criminal justice by destroying evidence72 or violating the
rights of criminal defendants.7"
Police abuses are kept in check by internal departmental guidelines,7 4
150-51 (1921).
66. For example, the Model Penal Code does not justify a citizen's mistake as to the lawfulness of
the force used in preventing a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Mandatory intervention would make this provision especially burdensome; the citizen would be re-
quired to intercede yet, at the same time, would be potentially liable for a mistaken course of action.
67. This is not a far-fetched notion. Segments of the population believe that law enforcement
should be taken from the criminal justice system, with its due process protections, and placed in the
hands of the citizenry. Consider, as one extreme example, the town of Kenneshaw, Georgia, which
passed an ordinance requiring the heads of households to own firearms. Police Mag., July 1982, at 4.
68. In noncriminal emergencies-for example, a motor vehicle accident or drowning-the cost of
intervention by untrained personnel is usually limited to negligence in the administration of emer-
gency assistance. Most states have Good Samaritan laws, which suggests a prevailing notion that the
benefits of intervention by bystanders in noncriminal emergencies outweigh the possible costs in the
administration of such assistance. See infra note 101.
69. In 1983 there were only 645,000 police officers and detectives in the United States. BUREAu
OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1985, at 403 (1985).
70. Research suggests that those who directly intervene in criminal situations are more prone to
physical confrontation. See Huston, Ruggiero, Conner & Geis, Bystander Intervention Into Crime: A
Study Based on Naturally-Occurring Episodes, 44 Soc. PSYCHOLOGY Q. 14 (1981) (intervenors
found to be more aggressive, physically imposing, and knowledgeable in self-defense: 84% of sample
had been injured); Shotland & Stebbins, supra note 10, at 524.
71. Police, trained in apprehending criminals, often make mistakes that endanger innocent on-
lookers. A study of the Chicago Police Department, for example, found that 14% of police shootings
were attributable to accident, stray bullets, or mistaken identification. See Geller & Karales, Shootings
of and by Chicago Police: Uncommon Crises, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1813, 1833 (1981).
The use of force by untrained bystanders could bring about a higher rate of unfortunate consequences.
72. But see Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to searches by private individuals).
73. As an extreme example of the potential for abuse of defendant rights when citizens become
directly involved in apprehending criminals, consider Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335
N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). In Mahnke, a group of "concerned citizens,"
unhappy with police efforts, abducted a murder suspect, struck the suspect in the head, and trans-
ported him to a remote cabin. The citizens questioned the suspect for hours, threatening him with a
knife, until he agreed to disclose the location of the victim's body.
74. Internal police directives can sometimes curb police misconduct. For example, after New York
City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy imposed a policy limiting the use of firearms by police,
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disciplinary proceedings7 5 and, in some jurisdictions, civilian review
boards." Even if local governments could create similar control structures
for private citizens," they would be reluctant to do so for fear that such
individuals would then be seen as operating under official direction, ex-
posing the municipality to potential liability for citizen excesses.7 8
Futhermore, members of the public whose rights have been infringed by
private intervenors would lack the clear legal remedies which protect them
against official misconduct.7 9
B. Civil Liability
Imposing civil liability on witnesses who fail to call the police would
not effectively increase crime reporting. It is unlikely that many civil suits
would be brought. Most bystanders would be judgment proof, and even if
a bystander of sufficient means were sued it would be difficult to prove
that the bystander's inaction was the direct cause of the crime victim's
incidents of police shootings declined from 803 to 372. Crim. Control Dig., Sep. 3, 1979, at 5.
75. The range of disciplinary procedures available to individual police administrators will vary in
accordance with the policies of a particular police force and the civil service laws of a particular state.
See, e.g., MoNr. CODE ANN. § 44-1-806 (1983) ("If after a hearing the division finds that any charge
or charges made against the patrolman are true, it may punish the offending party by a reprimand,
suspension without pay, demotion, or discharge.").
76. See Terrill, Complaint Procedures: Variations on the Theme of Civilian Participation, 10 J.
POLICE Sc. & An. 398 (1982) (discussing merits and disadvantages of civilian review boards).
77. In People v. Luciani, 120 Misc. 2d 826, 466 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1983), the defendant claimed that
his rights had been violated in an unconstitutional seizure by an off-duty auxiliary police officer.
Attempting to impose a control structure on citizen anti-crime activities, the court held that citizen
groups acting under "governmental supervision" are subject to the same standards of conduct as po-
lice. In Luciani, the auxiliary police officer had been off-duty (i.e., out of uniform and not on patrol)
and therefore was not considered to be under governmental supervision or subject to the same restric-
tions as police.
It is unclear how the Luciani "governmental supervision" standard would be applied in other
contexts. Would "blockwatchers" be considered to be under governmental supervision? Or tenant
patrols? Would these other groups be subject to less rigorous standards of behavior?
78. See Using Auxiliary Policemen Can Be Risky for Cities, 10 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 432
(1984) (discussing potential municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that might result from using
citizens in auxiliary police roles).
79. Individuals may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police for deprivations of
rights. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 781 n.3 (1979) (noting
filing of thousands of such suits in recent years). Additionally, it may be possible to bring suit for
constitutional deprivations by police directly under the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed'l Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). But see Note, Constitutional Law:
Bivens Again, 10 STETSON L. REv. 329 (1981) (suggesting that Supreme Court restricts Bivens
remedy to federal wrongdoing).
Private conduct or wrongs by citizens are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Cole v. Smith,
344 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953); Boyd v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Schools, 522 F. Supp. 1115
(D. Kan. 1981); Adkins v. Adkins, 459 F. Supp. 406 (S.D. W. Va. 1978); Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp.
151 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Elders v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 289 F. Supp. 630 (D. Minn.
1968).
Similarly, a defendant's private status precludes Bivens liability. Zerilli v. Evening -News Ass'n,
628 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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damages.8 0 In addition to being inadequately enforced, a civil statute
would lack the moral strength of a criminal statute and would therefore
be less successful in changing people's attitudes toward performing a pre-
scribed behavior. Criminal liability makes conduct more imperative, more
clearly reflects society's collective values,3 1 and more effectively educates
the public as to appropriate standards of conduct.82 Finally, civil liability
remedies only the individual wrong a crime victim suffers. It fails to ac-
count for the wrong society suffers when a crime goes unreported.83
A criminal statute is much better suited for the task of increasing crime
reporting. The ultimate purpose of a criminal statute is to direct individu-
als toward socially acceptable forms of behavior. This is accomplished
through both the deterrent effect of the imposition of sanctions," and the
moral force of criminal law.' The very existence of a criminal statute,
even an unpopular one, may compel obedience by virtue of the respect
most people have for the institution of law. 8 The criminal law can be
used to encourage a positive form of behavior or to reduce a negative one.
Other criminal statutes seeking to impose positive conduct have signifi-
cantly increased the desired behavior. Most significant here are the results
of one study which found that a mandatory child abuse reporting law 7
produced a significant permanent increase in the reporting of child
80. Compare the use of criminal sanctions where the risks and costs of enforcement are borne by
the state. See Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic
Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197, 211-13 (1965) (discussing advantage of
criminal sanctions over civil enforcement in achieving social goals).
81. A criminal statute must be passed by a legislature elected by the populace. Civil liability can
be created through judge-made common law which represents public opinion less directly than does a
legislative enactment.
82. One survey found that in West Germany, where a duty-to-rescue statute exists, 86% of the
interviewees realized that there was such a legal duty. In the United States, which at the time had no
such statute, only 19% believed there was such a legal duty. Zeisel, An International Experiment on
the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 209, 210 (.
Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
83. See D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 798, 807 (1975) (dis-
cussing how crime injures public as well as individual victims).
84. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL (1973) (discussing rationale, effect and research into use of deterrence in curbing
misconduct).
85. The more prevalent view concerning the relationship between law and morality is that of
H.L.A. Hart, who asserted that law is a reflection of morality. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEpT OF
LAW 199-200 (1961). But even Hart accepted the possibility that law could influence morality in the
first instance, as well as reflect it. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORAIrTY 1-2 (1966).
86. See Ball & Friedman, supra note 80, at 217 ("The very fact that a criminal statute has been
enacted by the legislature is a powerful factor in making the proscribed conduct illegitimate in the
eyes of a potential actor, even when the actor disagrees with the purpose of the law."); Fuller, Morals
and the Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 624, 629 (1942) ("[E]ven in the instance of
a very unpopular law, people are likely to observe it for some time after its passage simply because it
is the law of the land."); H.L.A. HART, THE CoNcEIr OF LAW, supra note 85, at 198 ("[Vlast
numbers [may] be coerced by laws which they do not regard as morally binding.").
87. See infra note 111.
1798
Reporting Crime
abuse. 8 Seat belt laws,89 motorcycle helmet laws,9" draft registration,91
and the so-called "pooper-scooper law,"9 are other cases in point.
IV. IMPOSING A DUTY TO REPORT CRIME
A. The Proposal
This Note is concerned only with the problems presented by witnesses
ignoring crime; its proposal is designed to combat such bystander apathy.
American courts have recognized that one of the duties of citizenship is to
report crime.9 3 Yet a mere failure to report a crime to the authorities is
rarely, if ever, considered a crime in itself.94
Although it is still the general rule that failure to report a crime is
neither a criminal offense nor the violation of a positive duty, there has
been a trend away from this rule. For example, the law has moved toward
imposing a positive duty to report crime upon those in public service,"
those in an especially strong position to know of certain crimes,96 or those
knowing of a particularly dangerous crime.97 There has also been some
88. Sawyer & Money, Legal Reform in Child Abuse Reporting, 5 EVALUATION REV. 758, 777
(1981).
89. Compliance with New York's mandatory seat-belt law exceeds 60%. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
1985, at B1, col. 1.
90. Following the recision of federal highway fund penalties for those states which did not have
mandatory motorcycle helmet laws in 1976, 26 states repealed their helmet laws. As a result, motorcy-
cle helmet usage declined approximately 50%, and the mortality rate of motorcyclists rose 38%. Wat-
son, Zador & Wilks, The Repeal of Helmet Use Laws and Increased Motorcyclist Mortality in the
United States, 1975-1978, 70 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 579, 582-83 (1980).
91. Despite the limited number of criminal prosecutions, compliance with Selective Service Regis-
tration stood at 94.2% as of 1982. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1982, at 14, col. 2.
92. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1979, at B3, col. 3 (noticeable feeling of compliance with pooper-
scooper law).
93. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966) ("It is an act of responsible citizenship
for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.") State courts
have echoed this sentiment. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 234 Cal. App. 2d 480, 487-88, 44 Cal. Rptr.
556, 559-60 (1965); People v. Austin, 108 Misc. 2d 829, 837, 438 N.Y.S.2d 908, 914 (1981); State v.
Grimmett, 54 N.C. App. 494, 498, 284 S.E.2d 144, 148 (1981), petition denied, appeal dismissed,
305 N.C. 304, 290 S.E.2d 706 (1982).
94. In People v. Donelson, 45 Ill. App. 3d 609, 611, 359 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (1977), the court
commented: "Our attention has not been called to a single case in any American jurisdiction directly
holding that a person commits an offense by merely remaining silent as to the commission of an
offense."
95. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-175 (1981) (criminal offense for member of police force to
withhold information relating to crime); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 33-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984)
(misdemeanor for public officer or juror to fail to report bribe); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-11-35 (1973)
(criminal offense for peace officer willfully to absent himself from scene of impending crime in order
to avoid knowledge of it).
96. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Friedman, 193 Pa. Super. 640, 644-46, 165 A.2d 678, 681 (1960)
(baseball pitcher had duty to report attempted bribery of athletic contest); Weber v. Western Bank,
336 N.W.2d 652, 653 (S.D. 1983) (supermarket required to turn over possibly fraudulent checks);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-175 (1981) (private detective must not withhold information about crime); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 250.35 (McKinney 1980) (misdemeanor for telephone company employees to fail to
report criminal communications).
97. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1226 (1979) (misdemeanor for owner to fail to report theft of
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movement toward imposing an obligation to report crimes upon the gen-
eral population. The vast majority of states have compounding-of-felony
statutes, which make it a crime for an individual to receive consideration
for not reporting an offense to the authorities. 98
This Note proposes that the problem of bystander failure to report
crime be addressed by making it a misdemeanor" for a felony witness to
fail to report the crime to the appropriate authorities.100 By limiting its
application to those persons who have actually witnessed a felony, the
proposed statute avoids the potential for overbroad coverage. At the same
time, the proposed statute avoids too limited a scope by providing for the
reporting of all types of felonies, rather than just those of violence.
Problems of notice are avoided by limiting the reporting obligation to
those felonies that are "of such a nature that a reasonable person in the
same circumstances would know it to be a serious offense."
A high standard of proof could ensure that only cases where there is a
strong probability of guilt would be prosecuted. Those who are unable to
report because of infirmities, for example, the aged, handicapped, or ill,
would have an affirmative defense, as would those who are not competent
to report, such as the young, the insane, and those who would incriminate
themselves by reporting.
explosives).
98. See generally Note, Compounding Crimes: Time For Enforcement, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 175
(1975) (collecting all compounding statutes and discussing their use).
99. Although nonreporting of crime is a serious problem, imposing only a limited penalty is essen-
tial to the success of a novel statute that proposes to alter traditional modes of behavior. Police, prose-
cutors, and judges would be unwilling to enforce a statute that placed new and unfamiliar demands on
the public if the penalty is unduly severe; thus, too severe a law would in effect become nullified.
This Note proposes an initial statute bearing a small sanction. After a period of time, it is hoped
that the public will not only accept the statute but demand stricter enforcement and higher penalties.
An example of this pattern can be seen in the development of drunk-driving laws. In the recent
past, juries were reluctant to convict drunk drivers for their first offense. See Broeder, The University
of Chicago Juy Project, 38 NFB. L. REv. 744, 750 (1959). Today, with the advent of such groups as
MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Drivers), drunk driving has become an issue of major public con-
cern, resulting in increased enforcement efforts, see Note, Curbing The Drunk Driver Under the
Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457 (1983), and the
enactment of stiffer penalties, see Winter, States Get Tougher on Drunk Drivers, 68 A.B.A. J. 140
(1982).
100. The proposed statute reads:
It is the duty of all citizens to report crimes to the police. Anyone who has witnessed a
felony shall report it to the police or other appropriate law enforcement body as soon as is
reasonably possible, provided that the person is placed in no danger by so reporting and a
convenient means of reporting is available. A failure to report a felony within a reasonable
time is a violation of this statute and thus a petty misdemeanor. For the purposes of this
statute, "felony" shall mean any crime which is punishable by more than one year in prison
and of such a nature that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would know it to be a
serious offense. This includes, but is not limited to, Murder, Robbery, Rape, Assault and
Battery, Burglary, and Auto Theft in all their degrees.
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B. Placing Mandatory Crime Reporting in the Current Social-Legal
Structure
There has been a general trend in American law of encouraging people
to help one another in civil contexts. Good samaritan statutes,10 l state
statutes requiring motorists involved in traffic accidents to render assis-
tance to injured parties, °2 and the efforts of some states to compensate
citizens for aid rendered in emergencies 03 are cases in point. As discussed
earlier,'" the imposition of an affirmative duty of intervention in criminal
contexts would be inappropriate. Mandatory crime reporting is more in
accord with current obligations imposed on citizens in criminal contexts
and it addresses the roots of underreporting.
The control of criminality is a societal responsibility shared by all. 10 5 In
accordance with this shared responsibility, society requires citizens to par-
ticipate in the criminal justice process when called upon to do so,1"' to be
witnesses at criminal trials,10 7 to be members of juries,10 8 and to cooperate
at the intake point of the criminal justice process.1 09 Citizens already have
101. In the past, the majority of good samaritan statutes were aimed solely at the medical profes-
sion and typically immunized doctors and other medical personnel from civil liability for any negli-
gence during the administration of emergency care. See Note, The Duty to Aid One in Peril: Good
Samaritan Laws, 15 How. L.J. 672, 677-78 (1969). Today, the vast majority of states have statutes
which immunize anyone from civil liability for negligence in the rendering of assistance during emer-
gencies. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.17 (West Supp. 1984);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.12 (1983).
102. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-4-1403 (1984); MisS. CODE ANN. § 63-3-405 (Supp.
1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-06 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-31 (Supp. 1983).
103. Some states have established special funds and claims procedures to compensate citizens who
are injured while giving assistance during an emergency. See, e.g., CAL GOV'T CODE § 13970 (West
1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5.4 (West Supp. 1984).
104. See supra part III A.
105. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) (convicted felon, like any other citizen, has
responsibility to cooperate with law enforcement authorities); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974) (criminal justice system's need for evidence overrides even interests of President of United
States).
106. The obligation to assist in the criminal justice process is so strong that it outweighs other
fundamental societal values. For example, a news reporter has no First Amendment privilege to de-
dine to aid a grand jury's investigation of criminality. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972).
Similarly, a witness may be compelled to testify at a criminal trial despite sincere religious objections,
People v. Woodruff, 26 A.D.2d 236, 238, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (1966), appeal dismissed, 20
N.Y.2d 879, 232 N.E.2d 652, 285 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1967), affld, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 159, 288
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1968), or genuine fear for the safety of herself or her family, People v. Carradine, 52
Ill. 2d 231, 287 N.E.2d 670 (1972).
107. Our courts may go so far as to subpoena an American citizen living in a foreign country and
require his return in order to testify at a criminal trial. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
438 (1932) ("It is also beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his govern-
ment is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony when-
ever he is properly summoned."). A witness who refuses to testify can be summarily confined. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1826 (West Supp. 1984).
108, Fines can be imposed on those who fail to perform their jury obligations. See, e.g., CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 238 (West Supp. 1985); ILL_ ANN. STAT. ch. 78, § 15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:79-1 (West 1976).
109, Many states require citizens to assist a peace officer in making an arrest when such an
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many obligations to report information to the authorities. Virtually every
state requires the reporting of traffic accidents 10 and child abuse."' x Leg-
islatures have also required the reporting of a wide variety of other occur-
rences." 2 Mandatory crime reporting is consistent with these duties.
Although, like any other human behavior, crime reporting may be in-
fluenced by a host of variables,"' mandatory crime reporting would be
effective in responding to the main social-psychological factors that lead to
underreporting. Research has shown that it is possible to instill a sense of
personal responsibility in bystanders to help prevent crime." 4 By inform-
officer so commands. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 150 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
195.10 (McKinney Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.23 (Page 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
946.40 (West 1982).
110. States require the immediate notification of the police or the filing of a written report with
the appropriate motor vehicle authorities following any traffic accident that results in injury or more
than a minimal amount of property damage. See, e.g., CAL. Vas. CODE § 20002 (West Supp. 1985);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-108 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 11-406 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 605 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
The Oregon statute, OR. REv. STAT. § 483.602 (1981), is especially interesting. It requires both
the drivers, and any witness to an accident to leave their name and address with the driver or occu-
pant of vehicles involved in an accident.
111. Virtually every state has passed some sort of child protection act which requires reporting of
suspected incidents of child abuse to the appropriate authorities. Most of these statutes apply only to
those directly involved in child care, such as teachers, social workers, doctors, and nurses. Failure to
report in many cases results in criminal penalties. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp.
1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 413
(McKinney 1983). A significant minority of states have passed statutes that impose a duty of
mandatory reporting on any person who has reason to suspect that a child is being neglected or
abused. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Supp. 1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976). For a complete listing of the various child abuse reporting
statutes see Note, Compounding Crimes: Time for Enforcement, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 184-87,
nn.60-67 (1975). It is somewhat curious that a large number of states have mandated citizen report-
ing in an area as ambiguous as child abuse and yet have ignored requiring the reporting of felonies.
112. Several states require a waiver of the physician-patient privilege and mandate reporting the
treatment of gunshot or knife wounds. Failure to report such incidents may subject the physician or
patient to criminal penalties. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-501 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4213 (1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 512 (West 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5106
(Purdon 1983). Garage owners in some states are required to report any bullet damage they find in
automobiles. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-26-12 (1982). Finally, some jurisdictions impose a gen-
eral duty on all citizens to report any unusual deaths of which they become aware. See New York
City, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 39, § 878-1.0 (1977).
113. The characteristics of the crime observed may affect the reporting rate. Cf Borofsky, Stollak
& MessE, Sex Differences in Bystander Reactions to Physical Assault, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 313 (1971) (males inclined to ignore physical assault upon female by male). The indi-
vidual personalities and characteristics of bystanders will also affect reporting. Gelfand, supra note
29, at 284-85 (persons with rural upbringing more likely to report crime). Similarly, the characteris-
tics of the victim will influence reporting. See Bleda, Bleda, Byrne & White, supra note 27, at 13
(crimes against corporate victims less likely to be reported); Gelfand, supra note 29, at 283. Prejudices
may also play a role. See Bleda, Bleda & White, Bystander Reactions to a Petty Crime, 14 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 287, 288 (1976) (women more likely to report and be reported); Dertke, Penner & Ulrich,
supra note 5, at 217 (whites more likely to report blacks than other whites). Stereotypes may influ-
ence crime reporting as well. See Steffensmeier & Terry, Deviance and Respectability: An Observa-
tional Study of Reactions to Shoplifting, 51 Soc. FORCES 417, 422-23 (1973) (bystanders more likely
to report those dressed as "hippies" ). But see Gelfand, supra note 29, at 282 ("hippies" not reported
at higher rate).
114. Experiments in which a bystander is asked to watch a stranger's belongings illustrate this
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ing the public that it is everyone's personal legal duty to report crime, the
proposed statute will counter the effects of diffusion of responsibility.
Mandatory crime reporting can also serve as a substitute for, or a sup-
plement to, 115 the social influence that traditionally came from sources
such as the community, family, and religion. By making the failure to
report crime a criminal offense, the proposal combats indecision through
its provision of an accepted course of action and its explicit determination
that a decision to ignore crime is wrong and socially unacceptable.
Finally, for those who engage in a cost-benefit analysis prior to reporting
a crime, the possibility of a criminal sanction would tilt the balance in
favor of reporting.
Three states, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Washington, have enacted stat-
utes similar to the model proposed in this Note."1 Unfortunately, all
three are plagued with serious defects as presently drafted.
Ohio has enacted a statute the pertinent part of which states: "No per-
son, knowing that a felony has been or is being committed, shall know-
ingly fail to report such information to law enforcement authorities. 1 17
As presently drafted the Ohio statute presents problems of being overly
broad and vague. The failure to define "knowledge" leaves open the pos-
sibility that persons with only second-hand information concerning a
crime, or perhaps with only mere rumor or suspicion of a crime, may be
under an obligation to report. The one reported case involving this statute
resulted in acquittal and severely narrowed the statute's scope.11 8
Massachusetts and Washington have avoided the problems of the Ohio
statute by requiring first-hand knowledge of a crime before imposing an
obligation to report. Massachusetts imposes an affirmative reporting obli-
gation upon those who know that another person is the victim of one of a
specific group of violent felonies listed in the statute and are "at the scene
of said crime." ' 9 Washington requires reporting by those who have "wit-
phenomenon. After acceptance of such a commitment, the rate of intervention significantly increased
when a subsequent staged theft occurred. See Harrell & Goltz, Effect of Victim's Need and Previous
Accusation of Theft Upon Bystander's Reaction to Theft, 112 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 41 (1980); Mori-
arty, supra note 10, at 373; Shaffer, Rogel & Hendrick, supra note 12, at 308.
115. Cf R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 18-25 (1942) (discussing how law has
supplanted religion, community, and family as primary means of social control).
116. Also of note is Colorado's recently enacted statute which grants immunity from civil liability
to any person or corporation who in good faith reports a crime. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115
(Supp. 1984).
117. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (Page 1982). The statute also contains a detailed list of
qualifications to this duty intended to protect privileged relationships such as those between doctor
and patient, and clergyman and parishioner.
118. In re Stichtenoth, 67 Ohio App. 2d 108, 425 N.E.2d 957 (1980) (holding that statute did not
require direct reporting to police as long as events occur which result in notification of authorities).
119. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1985) ("Whoever knows that another
person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, murder, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the
scene of said crime shall, to the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or
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nessed the actual commission of a felony involving violence or threat of
violence."12 Although these provisions are in keeping with the basic argu-
ments of this Note, they are too narrowly drawn. As both of these statutes
are restricted to violent crimes, such important categories of crime as bur-
glary or auto theft are not within their ambit.
C. Problems of Mandatory Crime Reporting
A statute requiring witnesses to report crimes is not without potential
costs. The statute's benefits, however, far outweigh its potential
disadvantages.
1. Concern about Breaches of Privilege
When discussing an affirmative duty to report crime, one must consider
the effect of such a statute on the confidentiality of privileged communica-
tions, such as those between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, and
priest and parishioner. The proposed statute does not change the status of
these relationships.
By its terms, the statute applies only to those who actually witness a
felony and would thus rarely affect these confidential relationships. In
those few situations where, for example, a doctor actually witnessed a pa-
tient's felony, the statute should apply. These professionals have a duty to
protect society against crime and thus do not have a right to conceal infor-
mation about criminality.121 States which recognize evidentiary privileges
for such relationships could still honor them and be consistent with the
proposed statute.
2. Selectivity of Enforcement
The criminal offense of failure to report a felony would be difficult to
detect, and a large number of violators would go unpunished. Those ap-
prehended and prosecuted would in all likelihood be guilty of the most
others, report said crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable.
Any person who violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor
more than two thousand and five hundred dollars.").
120. WASH. RyV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (1977) ("Whoever, having witnessed the actual com-
mission of a felony involving violence or threat of violence or having witnessed preparations for the
commission of a felony involving violence or threat of violence, does not as soon as reasonably possible
make known his knowledge of such to the prosecuting attorney, police, or other public officials of the
state of Washington having jurisdiction over the matter, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor:. Pro-
vided, That nothing in this act shall be so construed to affect existing privileged relationships as
provided by law.") (emphasis in original).
121. For example, there have been cases holding that a psychiatrist must warn potential victims of
criminal acts planned by their patients. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d
425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, (1976); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594,
162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
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egregious violations brought to the attention of the police by members of
the public. 22 The possibility of selective enforcement, however, should not
bar the enactment of a statute unless it is constructed so as to require
facially impermissible discrimination. 23 The conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not a constitutional violation. 24 The govern-
ment may choose to prosecute only the most egregious violators,125 or the
public protesters against a law,126 as a means of ensuring compliance. The
government does not have to seek out violators, but may instead prosecute
only those who are made known to it.1 27 Selective enforcement is unconsti-
tutional only if the defendant successfully proves that: 1) others similarly
situated were not subjected to enforcement, and 2) the selection of the
defendant was based on invidious discrimination (race or religion) or in
retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights.
1 21
3. Retaliation Against Those Who Report
Although physical reprisal against citizens for reporting crime is proba-
bly rare, 29 there would no doubt be cases where forcing a citizen to come
forward would place him or her in physical danger. In theory, such cases
should not be problematic, as it is in the interest of the police and prose-
cutors to do their utmost to protect those who report, in order to en-
courage compliance with the statute. If this is not sufficient incentive,
there is also some precedent for a common law right of action against a
municipality for negligently failing to protect citizens who provide infor-
mation on criminality.1 30 In practice, however, a lack of resources may
122. Any criminal statute has the potential to be abused. However, while this is a caution to
observe police behavior, it does not justify failure to enact a statute that serves a valid purpose. There
are substantial checks on police misconduct. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. Lawsuits
against police by civil rights activists may be particularly effective. See McCoy, Enforcement Work-
shop Lawsuits Against Police-What Impact Do They Really Have?, 20 CRIM. L. BuL. 49 (1984)
(suits against police found to have significant deterrent effect on police misconduct).
123. An example would be a law criminalizing the exercise of a particular religion.
124. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
125. Cook v. City of Price, Carbon City, Utah, 566 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1977); Barton v.
Malley, 626 F.2d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. United States v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 681, 687-88 (N.D. Iowa 1982) (draft registration
protester), rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Tibbetts, 646
F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1981) (tax protester).
127. See Wayte v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 1524 (1985) (upholding use of passive enforcement in
draft registration cases). The fact that a criminal statute is routinely violated is no defense to a prose-
cution. United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Standefer, 452
F. Supp. 1178, 1188 (W.D. Pa. 1978), affid, 610 F.2d 1076 (3rd Cir. 1979), affid 447 U.S. 10
(1980).
128. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229-30 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct.
2344 (1984); United States v. Tibbetts, 646 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1981); Barton v. Malley, 626
F.2d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 681, 687 (N.D. Iowa 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1984).
129. See supra note 30.
130. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958),
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result in instances of neglect by the authorities. The ultimate success of
the proposed statute depends on members of the public having confidence
in the ability of the criminal justice system to provide for their safety
when coming forward with information on criminality. Thus, the propo-
sal is only the first step; it must be accompanied by a level of effort and
resources on the part of law enforcement agencies that is sufficient to dis-
pel any fears for personal safety when reporting felonies.
CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated the utility of mandatory witness crime re-
porting for combatting the national problem of failure to report crime.
Mandatory crime reporting reaches the psychological and sociological
causes of this phenomenon and would teach the public the correct course
of action when confronted with a criminal emergency. Consequently, the
proposed statute would serve as a moral impetus for desirable social be-
havior, while avoiding the vigilante justice that might accompany imposi-
tion of a duty to rescue in criminal situations.
-Jack Wenik
in which the court held: "[T]he public. . . owes a special duty to use reasonable care for the protec-
tion of persons who have collaborated with it in the arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reason-
ably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration." Id. at 269.
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